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Dietlind Stolle (Montréal)
Trusting Strangers – The Concept of
Generalized Trust in Perspective
Generalisiertes Vertrauen ist eine wichtige gesellschaftliche Ressource und ist als integraler As-
pekt und Messinstrument des sozialen Kapitals anerkannt. Dieser Artikel gibt einen Überblick über
das Konzept des generalisierten Vertrauens. Hierzu wird zunächst generalisiertes Vertrauen mit an-
deren Formen von Vertrauen in der interdisziplinären Literatur verglichen, wie strategisches oder
rationales Vertrauen, identitätsbezogenes Vertrauen sowie moralisches Vertrauen. Diese Vertrauens-
modelle unterscheiden sich in der Auffassung darüber, was Vertrauen ist, wie es entwickelt wird, und
hinsichtlich der Zahl von BürgerInnen, die in das Vertrauen miteinbezogen werden. Zum zweiten
werden die Erkenntnisse der Vertrauensmodelle benutzt, um den Ursprung und die Ursachen des
generalisierten Vertrauens zu identifizieren. Dabei wird zwischen zwei Ansätzen unterschieden: der
zivilgesellschaftliche und der institutionelle Mechanismus. Die empirische Forschung konnte die
Annahmen über die Relevanz von Vereinen für die Entwicklung von generalisiertem Vertrauen nicht
in der ursprünglichen Form bestätigen. Stattdessen spielen institutionelle Aspekte wie Gerechtigkeit
und Unparteilichkeit eine größere Rolle für generalisiertes Vertrauen, wobei allerdings weitere For-
schung das Kausalitätsproblem entflechten muss.
1. Introduction
“Do not trust a stranger.” Warnings ot this and
of similar nature increasingly belong to the vo-
cabulary of our every day lives. We read them
in travel books, brochures for children, or on
websites that educate about viruses. The Child
Safety rules of the Canadian organization Child
Find even advises children not to walk alone on
streets, and to look out for buddies: “There is
safety in numbers.” From a young age on, chil-
dren get this message that it is a dangerous world
outside. Recent events reported in the media
reinforce this message: we ought to distrust the
stock market, distrust companies, distrust cor-
rupt political leaders, distrust strangers who
abduct and molest children. The risk society that
some have predicted, might have turned into a
society of distrust, more and more shaken by
fears and anxiety and the desire of protection.
As trust and confidence become a rare commod-
ity, it is certainly no wonder that so many re-
searchers care about the issue. Trust is a public
good and it is important for individuals, for com-
munities, for regions and for nations. Generally,
high levels of trust help reduce transaction costs.
Trust reduces uncertainty about the future and
the need to continually make provisions for the
possibility of opportunistic behavior among ac-
tors. Trust increases peoples’s desire to take risks
for productive social exchange (Tyler 2001).
In this article we examine a very special form
of trust, namely generalized trust. It indicates
the potential readiness of citizens to cooperate
with each other and to abstract preparedness to
engage in civic endeavors with each other. At-
titudes of generalized trust extend beyond the
boundaries of face-to-face interaction and in-
corporate people who are not personally known.
These attitudes of trust are generalized when
they go beyond specific personal settings in
which the partner to be cooperated with is al-
ready known. They even go beyond the bound-
aries of kinship and friendship, and the bound-
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aries of acquaintance. In this sense, the scope
of generalized trust should be distinguished from
the scope of trust toward people one personally
knows.1
This more immediate form of trust may be
called private or personalized trust, which re-
sults from cooperation experiences and repeated
interaction with the immediate circle of coop-
erators, whether that be a family, community,
or fellow members of a voluntary association.
This form of trust might be related to general-
ized trust, which we will explore below. The
scope of generalized trust also needs to be dis-
tinguished from identity-based forms of trust,
which only include people one personally knows
and those individuals who fit into a certain so-
cial identity category that one holds. This form
of trust building might also explain how gener-
alized trust comes about, which we will also
explore below.
In the remainder of this article we will exam-
ine the concept of generalized trust more closely.
First, the importance of generalized trust will
be considered based on the results of the recent
empirical literature. We then compare general-
ized trust to other notions of trust in the inter-
disciplinary literature in order to tease out the
specific characteristics of generalized trust. Fur-
ther on we will examine the sources and origins
of generalized trust, as well as the various ap-
proaches to it and their empirical findings re-
lated to the social capital literature. It will be-
come clear that the cause and effect of general-
ized trust are often not clearly filtered out.
2. The Importance of Generalized Trust
Generalized trust has been the focus of the
social capital school and much related work on
civic attitudes and behaviors (Fukuyama 1995;
Putnam 1993, 2000). It is seen as an important
ingredient for the social and political realm.
More specifically, in the political sphere, gen-
eralized trust allows citizen to join their forces
in social and political groups, and it enables them
to come together in citizens’ initiatives more
easily. In the social sphere, generalized trust
facilitates life in diverse societies, fosters acts
of tolerance, and promotes acceptance of other-
ness. Life in diverse societies is easier, happier,
and more confident in the presence of general-
ized trust (Uslaner 2002).
There are multiple mechanisms that might
help to facilitate cooperation and collective ac-
tion beyond trust. In the economic sphere we
deal most obviously with market mechanisms
and contracts as well as an array of monitoring
institutions that substitute for the lack of gener-
alized trust (Lichbach 1996). The judicial sys-
tem enforces contracts and prosecutes cheaters;
and a number of private institutions, such as
banks, credit bureaus, and several other kinds
of agencies, contribute to limiting opportunis-
tic behavior (Zak/Knack 2001). There are also
a number of informal monitoring mechanisms
such as a variety of sanctions, e.g. guilt for the
violation of moral norms, and damage to one’s
reputation. However, not all of these mecha-
nisms are suitable or affordable as devices to
ensure cooperation in the social spehre.
Even in the social sphere, life is possible in
the absence of generalized trust. In many soci-
eties cooperation takes place on the basis of hi-
erarchical structures and obligations, for ex-
ample in patron-client relationships, kinship net-
works, familialism, particularized trust for mem-
bers of one’s in-group, knowledge-based trust
for individuals one knows, and individual or
group-based reputation (see the most classic
example in Banfield 1958). Altruism might be
another device that facilitates cooperation. Fi-
nally, there is an institutional solution to the is-
sue of cooperation. Axelrod (1984) has argued
that a tit-for-tat strategy, or a form of reciprocity
combined with the perception that a relationship
is long-term in character induces cooperation.
Reciprocity instead of trust, Hooghe (2002) ar-
gues, might be behind the peaceful cooperation
of previously opposed cultural groups. In the
context of the problem of the commons, Elinor
Ostrom and her associates have argued for many
years that regulations, which are perceived as
fair and un-corrupt, contribute to the develop-
ment of cooperation (Ostrom 1990, 2001).
However, even with these alternative mecha-
nisms, there are several reasons why general-
ized trust remains an important ingredient of
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social capital, and in fact gains in importance in
modern societies. Increasing spatial and social
mobility, growing role segmentation and grow-
ing communication make social interactions
more fluctuating, more situation-specific and
much more diversified. Modern societies are par-
ticularly transaction- and bargaining-rich
(Crenshaw 1997, 93); and many of our transac-
tions increasingly involve people whom we do
not know (see also Offe 1999). An increasing
division of labor implies diversification and a
greater variety of social interactions and roles.
This in turn means a growing number of choices
and multiplied opportunities for the individual.
In fact, the rise in geographic mobility, immi-
gration and ethnic and religious mixing, the ris-
ing multiplicity in viewpoints and lifestyles as
well as easy access to other cultures require and
enable the development of a resource that helps
to bridge people’s differences. To take advan-
tage of the growing multiplicity of choices it is
necessary and possible that people develop an
abstract form of trust which is broad and exten-
sive so that it can be applied to many different
social situations but needs no personal relation
to ‘the other’ (Eckstein 1988). Consequently,
highly-intensive, thick, or what some have la-
beled particularized trust based on closed in-
groups should diminish, while thin or extensive
trust with a wider radius increases. From that
perspective, generalized trust can be character-
ized as less-intensive but more extensive trust.
Since the functioning of democracy needs so-
cial integration beyond kinship and family ties,
on a national level it is plausible that thin and
extensive trust with a broad radius is much more
conducive to democracy than the reverse com-
bination (thick, intensive trust with a narrow ra-
dius). Generalized trust is exactly the form of
trust which is needed to make the social interac-
tions in complex diversified societies work. It
emerges from the multiplicity of impersonal and
contractual interactions based on individual au-
tonomy, independence, emancipation, and self-
confidence (Inglehart 1997; Stolle/Welzel 2000).
Generalized trust has been shown to be asso-
ciated with economic development and growth.
Fukuyama (1995) makes the argument that lack
of generalized trust prevents the building of large
scale professionally-managed modern economic
organizations. Knack and Keefer (1997) dem-
onstrate how particularly generalized trust com-
pared to other indicators of social capital is an
important predictor of economic growth. Zak
and Knack (2001) show that even controlling
for various institutional aspects that facilitate
investment and growth, such as the protection
of property rights, contract enforceability, and
the lack of corruption, generalized trust is still
an important additional predictor of economic
growth. Generalized trust is also associated with
democratic stability and democracy (Inglehart
1997; see also Hartmann in this volume).
At the individual level, generalized trust plays
an important role for engagement in coopera-
tion. Trusters do not only engage in mutually
beneficial relations more frequently (Hardin
2001; Yamagishi 2001), they are also generally
more socially active, engaged, tolerant, and
more inclined to support liberal rights, such as
minority rights and free speech. Such individu-
als are also more likely to serve jury duty in the
United States (Uslaner 2002), an important be-
havioral indicator of cooperation. Experimen-
tal evidence shows fairly conclusively that gen-
eralized trust matters for cooperation, especially
in one-shot situations and in multiple n-person
games. In repeated games or in-games with spe-
cific partners, generalized trust is not a discrimi-
nating factor in determining outcomes, although
even in this case, trusters are more likely to give
people a second chance (Rotter 1980; Wrights-
man 1966; Yamagishi 2001). Clearly, general-
ized trust is an advantage to people and societ-
ies that possess it, as trusters are more likely to
initiate cooperative relations that might be ben-
eficial for themselves as well as for their social
environment, which benefits from cooperation.
The question about cause and effect remains.
To what extent does generalized trust facilitate
democratic institutions and economic growth?
Or does the possibility exist that generalized
trust is a product of certain aspects of demo-
cratic institutions or growth? To better under-
stand generalized trust and its sources we will
examine now how it can be distinguished from
other forms of trust in the interdisciplinary lit-
erature.
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3. Conceptions of Trust
One of the reasons that research on trust has
not yet been able to clearly identify cause and
effect is that there are enormous disagreements
among scholars as to the meaning and defini-
tion of trust. There is no unified and widely ac-
cepted theory of trust that can guide the above-
mentioned empirical findings (however, see
Hardin 1993 and forthcoming; Rotter 1980;
Seligman 1997; Uslaner 2002; Yamagishi/
Yamagishi 1994). In fact, the scholarly under-
standing of trust differs dramatically; the dif-
ferent views, meanings, and definitions of trust
that have been put forth are numerous.2  It is
important to note that not all accounts of trust
work with or utilize the concept of generalized
trust, but instead explain trust that we develop
for a specific person, such as knowledge-based
trust, or for representatives of a specific group
of people, such as identity-based or particular-
ized trust. Overall, generalized trust can be dis-
tinguished from three other main types of (in-
terpersonal) trust that are also reflected in the
interdisciplinary literature: strategic or rational,
identity- or group-based, and moral accounts of
trust. These trust models differ in relation to
what trust is, as to how it can be generated, and
in the extent to which it expands to include vari-
ous circles of people. We examine the types of
trust below aiming to understand how exactly
generalized trust is similar or different.
3.1 Strategic or Rational Accounts of Trust
From a rational perspective, trust is a calcula-
tion of future cooperation (Williamson 1993).
It is warranted when the expected gain from
placing oneself at risk to another is positive, but
not otherwise. The decision to accept such a risk
is taken to imply trust (Coleman 1990). Situa-
tions that involve calculative trust, claims
Coleman, constitute a subclass of those involv-
ing risk. John Dunn (1988, 73) has called this
“coping with uncertainty over time”. People’s
decisions to trust others or to cooperate with
others are based on the probability that those
others will reciprocate. They are situations in
which the risk one takes depends on the perfor-
mance of another actor (Coleman 1990, 91). The
authors using this approach agree that when we
trust someone, we assume that the probability
of that person’s actions being beneficial or at
least not detrimental to us will be high enough
to risk engaging in some sort of cooperation with
the person (Gambetta 1988). In this account,
trust is an individual resource, and it is utilized
when the calculations of loss and benefits al-
low us to proceed with the interaction or coop-
eration. The process of calculation could involve
checking the references of someone involved
in a business transaction3  or relying on past
records of performance of the person in ques-
tion. Institutional rules, contracts, and sanctions
obviously would support the ability to trust.
However, as Gambetta points out, trust is in-
herently embedded in uncertainty. “For trust to
be relevant,” he claims, “there must be the pos-
sibility of exit, betrayal, defection” by those who
trust (Gambetta 1988, 218ff.).
In these fundamentally rational accounts of
trust, one might expect that given the same in-
centive structures, each person should develop
the same level of trust. We know that this is not
the case. In addition, there is not always enough
information available to make a good calcula-
tion of risks. In this research tradition then, the
current task is to tease out the mechanisms that
can substitute for the missing information.4
Moreover, rational or strategic accounts of trust
fail to explain why some people would usually
take the initiative to cooperate even with little
or no information about the other. In fact, these
accounts cannot easily explain why certain
people take a more trusting approach in coop-
erating with others, while others do not. I turn
to a version of the rational or instrumental ac-
count of trust that seems more useful for the
concept of generalized trust.
Russell Hardin has probably developed the
most prominent rational theory of trust and trust-
worthiness in his “encapsulated interest account
of trust” (Hardin 1993, 2002). According to his
theory, one trusts when one has adequate rea-
sons to believe that it will be in the other person’s
interest to be trustworthy (Hardin 2002). The
reasons for such a belief arise when one recog-
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nizes the commitments of the trusted to act in
one’s interest. As a result, trust varies because
such commitments vary in degree. This theory
of “encapsulated interest” works in relationships
that are iterated; however, not all real-life situa-
tions have the character of a repeated game.
Even though Hardin’s account is a theory of trust
and trustworthiness and not a theory of gener-
alized trust, there are elements in his epistemol-
ogy of trust that are useful for the concept of
generalized trust, especially his account of how
trust is “learned.”
To explain different capacities to trust, Hardin
develops the street-level epistemology of trust,
in which trust is based on personal experiences
of the past, the ability to generalize from spe-
cific persons and encounters to new settings.
Since in the encapsulated interest account, one
must know something about the incentives the
other has to fulfill the trust, the device is to use
a generalization from similar others in the face
of new persons (Hardin 2002). This will allow
the truster to recognize the incentives of the
person to be trusted to act in a trustworthy fash-
ion. This epistemology of trust is very closely
related to the theory of trust expectancy devel-
oped by Julian Rotter, who created the general-
ized trust-expectancy scale. He also argued that
the expectancies a person has are learned from
experiences with parents, peers, and teachers or
verbal statements from significant sources, and
then generalized to novel situations (Rotter
1954, 1967, 1980).
In the encapsulated interest account of trust,
there are then two scenarios of encounters with
others for which the level of trust is defined. First,
if the person is known, the trust is determined
by previous experiences with that person. This
might be called private or knowledge-based trust.
Second, if the person is not known, one utilizes
generalization from the experience with others
(Hardin 2002). New experiences of another’s
trustworthiness, whether good or bad, lead to an
updating of the overall trust level, a concept that
is fairly close to generalized trust described be-
low. This overall trust level, or expectation of
others’ trustworthiness, is a fairly encompass-
ing factor that determines all further expecta-
tions of others, including specific others.
This is a very interesting account of how we
estimate the trustworthiness of others in our in-
teractions, yet it is not entirely clear how spe-
cific experiences of interaction can actually be
generalized. What are the mechanisms of gen-
eralization, how do we select criteria that we
transfer to other people?5  The following con-
cept of trust attempts to solve that problem.
3.2 Identity- or Group-based Accounts
of Trust
In contrast to the strategic views of trust, there
is another conception of trust that is based
mainly on identification and categorization.
Most of these draw on the social categorization
theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1974,
1979). The main claim is that our conceptions
of ourselves, and of others are to some degree
category-based. Thinking in broad categories
allows us to reduce the complexity of idiosyn-
cratic observations.
The development of trust in others, too, can
be conceptualized within this categorization
approach. In the extreme version of this argu-
ment, people who completely identify with
members of their group, take on the needs and
desires of others as personal goals (as one form
of trust in Lewicki/Bunker 1996). More gener-
ally, people trust those to whom they feel close,
whom they believe are similar to them, and with
whom they are familiar (see Staub 1978). This
would most likely include family members,
friends, and other close relations. However,
some scholars have developed this thesis fur-
ther and have tried to explain how such trust
might actually develop beyond those we know
personally.
The causal mechanism at play here is that
people trust those with whom they share and
recognize a group identity much more than those
with whom they do not (Brewer 1981; Kramer
1991; Kramer et al. 1996; Messick 1991;
Messick/Kramer 2001). For the shared identity,
certain in-group criteria matter, such as behav-
ioral similarity, geographical proximity, fre-
quency of interaction, or common fate. These
criteria work relative to the salience of the par-
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ticular in-group membership. They can serve as
a rule for defining the boundaries of low-risk
interpersonal trust that bypasses the need for
personal knowledge and the costs of negotiat-
ing reciprocity with individual others. As a
consequence of shifting from the personal to the
social group level of identity, the individual can
adopt a sort of “depersonalized trust” based on
category membership alone (Brewer 1981). The
cognitive process is that social categorization
enhances the perceived similarity among indi-
viduals who share membership in a social cat-
egory, which in turn enhances the consensus and
understanding that others perceive the situation
similarly. There is an understanding about
shared norms (codes of conduct) – especially in
groups with high entry costs and strong social-
ization costs, such as ethnic groups. Since psy-
chological distance is reduced, orientations are
directed toward mutual outcomes rather than
individual gains. Marilynn Brewer calls this
form of ethnocentrism in-group bias, which
means that within these social “identity” catego-
ries the probability of reciprocity and trust is
assumed to be high.
In addition, these group memberships provide
mechanisms for increasing the perceived prob-
ability of sanctions against the failures to re-
ciprocate or to act trustworthy. Defection is not
just seen as an individual victimization but as
the violation of group norms. Such conceptions
of trust elucidate well how trust is developed
in close-knit and possibly even outsider com-
munities on the one hand, and in all kinds of
other group situations on the other. However,
we need to know more about shifting group
loyalties and temporary or evoked group salien-
cies, because individuals can be members of a
variety of groups. Moreover, in some instances
one identity such as gender will be favored over
another such as nationality (or the other way
around), depending on the circumstances. The
boundaries of the social categories must be clear
and/or salient for group identity to work as a
mobilizing force for in-group trust. More re-
search is needed to determine the conditions for
group boundaries to have such an effect: does
it take physical proximity, face-to-face contact,
common kinship, or something else to create a
common identity and resulting trust to be
evoked?
The argument of previously mentioned au-
thors helps to understand both how trust can
evolve collectively and with individuals whom
one does not necessarily know. The identifica-
tion based on social categories allows one to
reach out and extend the trust toward other
people. In a way, it does not really matter
whether the trusted individual is actually going
to fulfill our expectations; in fact, the person
will be excused more readily if he or she does
not because of the group membership6
(Messick/Kramer 2001). In contrast to Hardin,
one’s ability to judge the trustworthiness of oth-
ers is not constantly updated with new experi-
ences. Trust, then, is much less dependent on
the other, and on the expectations and calcula-
tions that go into a prediction about how the
other will behave, but trust rests more on one’s
own presumptions.7  In sum, identities can serve
to mobilize the decision to trust another person.
This is how trust extends from the people one
knows to those whom one does not know in
person, but who is identifiable as a member of a
group to which one feels close. However, this
type of trust does not allow us to extend our
trust to a person about whom we know nothing
or very little.
3.3 Moral Trust
Another group of scholars developed the un-
derstanding of trust as a moral phenomenon.
Uslaner, who also uses the concept of “general-
ized or moral trust” – even though his use of the
concept differs slightly from the one presented
below – describes it loosely as “faith in strang-
ers” (Uslaner 2002). It stands as trust for people
whom we do not know and it extends to people
who are different from ourselves. In this sense,
moral trust as described by Uslaner is different
from identity-based trust. Where identity-based
trust is developed on the basis of shared group
identities, moral trust is based on the understand-
ing that people share underlying values.
In contrast to the rational accounts of trust, to
Hardin’s account of encapsulated self-interest,
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and to a lesser degree in contrast to identity-
based trust, we are even less concerned with the
person to be trusted when considering moral
accounts of trust. We trust because we believe
in the goodwill of others (Seligman 1997, 43).
We treat people as if they were trustworthy be-
cause we believe that others will not take ad-
vantage of us (Uslaner 2002). Moralistic trust
is strongly embedded in an optimistic view of
the world; it is a general attitude that determines
our interactions with people, generally regard-
less of the context, of the other person, and even
regardless of prior experiences. Since this is such
a general attitude, moral trust is also developed
differently from the trust that Hardin describes
in that it is not based on prior experiences. Prior
experiences do not matter in dealings with
strangers, as we cannot predict anything about
their trustworthiness. In fact, moral trusters who
experience a breach of trust will not, as a result,
change their view of others, as in Hardin’s sce-
nario, but they will continue to give others a
chance.8  Moral trust is thus a stable trait of an
individual and a collective.
If we assume that people act consistently in
dealings with others, then why is it that some
people behave more optimistically and are more
trusting than others? Uslaner refers to the im-
portance of parents, to collective experiences
that matter in the formation of moral trust. Large-
scale events like the Watergate affair or the ex-
periences of the civil rights movement qualify
as influences on moral trust, whereas the daily
individual experiences of cooperation do not.
However, where do we draw the line? Even if
some events influence our trust and others do
not, how exactly do I extend my trust toward
others? Even if the most formative experience
in trust development is related to parental up-
bringing, it is important to understand which
other life events and experiences might influ-
ence moral trust and how.
Our review of the most prominent accounts
of trust in the interdisciplinary literature moves
now to the concept of generalized trust. The ar-
gument here is that some questions remain un-
answered in the three most common accounts
of trust when relating them to generalized trust.
Strategic and identity models cannot easily ex-
plain how we extend the trust we develop for
people or groups of people we know for others
we do not know well. Both accounts do not cap-
ture the wider radius of trust that characterizes
the model of generalized trust. The moral trust
account depicts the same radius, however, the
mechanism of how the trust for people we do
not know well works, is less clear. Moral trust
is described as a stable value and stable approach
to interactions with others that we obtain early
on in life. Is such encompassing trust really in-
dependent of the circumstances and institutional
structures in which the act of trust takes place?
As we will see below, generalized trust is seen
as influenced and shaped by a variety of con-
textual factors throughout one’s lifetime, includ-
ing one’s childhood.
3.4 Generalized Trust
Like Uslaner’s moral trust, generalized atti-
tudes of trust extend beyond the boundaries of
face-to-face interaction and incorporate people
who are not personally known. They are indi-
cated by an abstract preparedness to trust oth-
ers and to engage in actions with others. These
attitudes of trust are generalized when they go
beyond specific personal settings in which the
partner to be cooperated with is already known.
Generalized trust is an approach to other people
that works in many situations, yet is not com-
pletely independent of the context as we will
see below.
The scope of generalized trust is important to
point out vis-à-vis the criticisms the concept of
social capital has received, which highlight that
social capital has its dark sides (Portes/Landolt
1996). Surely, if social capital is measured in
all types of trust, including strong in-group trust
and kinship as well as tightly-knit networks, then
it would be clear that demands of conformity
and exclusions of outsiders could produce the
other, darker side of the social capital coin.
However, generalized attitudes of trust by defi-
nition cannot exclude outsiders because both are
not just directed at a certain group of the popu-
lation, but at people in general. In other words,
if generalized trust exists, it should be all-inclu-
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sive. The important question for the remainder
of this article is how this form of trust is gener-
ated.
4. Mechanisms of Generalized Trust
Development
From the analysis of the earlier accounts of
trust, we know that it seems easier to develop
any form of trust for those we know and inter-
act with a lot, and whose identity we share.
These are forms of knowledge-based trust, or
identity-based trust.9  We learned that these types
of trust are built either from positive experience,
closeness, or the sharing of identity. The im-
portant question is how the trust or distrust that
we obviously develop so easily for people we
know well can be extended to and used for the
growth of generalized trust, or trust for people
we do not know well. How do we make the leap
of faith to people we do not know? How do we
generalize and feel comfortable with those about
whom we do not have much information? How
is generalized trust institutionalized? In other
words, we need a mechanism that explains the
development of generalized trust.
The literature on generalized trust linked to
the concept of social capital is clearly divided
on the question of the causes and origin. We
can mostly distinguish between societal and in-
stitutional mechanisms. On the one side are
scholars who argue that variations in the amount
and type of social capital can be explained pri-
marily by societal mechanisms and mostly by
our experiences in social interactions with oth-
ers (Banfield 1958; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam
1993). In this approach, the capacity of a soci-
ety to produce generalized trust among its citi-
zens is often linked to the long-term experience
of social organization anchored in historical and
cultural experiences that can be traced back over
centuries. The society-centered accounts see the
most important mechanism for the generation
of generalized trust as regular social interaction,
such as membership in voluntary associations
or more informal types of social interactions
which have been included in later work. In con-
trast to this society-centered approach, the in-
stitution-centered accounts of social capital
theory respond that for social capital to flour-
ish, it needs to be embedded in and linked to
formal political and legal institutions (Levi
1998; Newton 1999; Newton/Norris 2000;
Rothstein/Kumlin 2001; Rothstein/Stolle forth-
coming; Stolle forthcoming). According to this
group of scholars, generalized trust does not
exist independently of politics or government
in the realm of civil society. Instead, govern-
ment policies and political institutions create,
channel and influence the amount and type of
social capital. No single source of generalized
trust is all-encompassing in its explanatory
power, and research on the development of gen-
eralized trust is only at the beginning stages, as
will be seen in the following review of these
approaches.
5. The Importance of Social Interactions
Social capital theory suggests that for gener-
alized trust to thrive, we need cooperative ex-
periences with others in horizontal networks of
civic engagement (Putnam 1993). However, we
need to go a step further and ask with whom is
the interaction important for our trust develop-
ment and why, and in addition, what is the un-
derlying structure of the interaction that is con-
nected to generalized trust or lack thereof? A
comprehensive theory of generalized trust needs
to specify these conditions more precisely. In
thinking through an answer, let us consider rel-
evant conceptualizations and their integrated
mechanisms of trust development that can be
useful for a theory of generalized trust.
Could generalized trust be developed as an
extension of trust from those one knows per-
sonally to others in the same identity group as
the identity-based trust account might suggest?
Given that generalized trust is commonly uti-
lized in situations with strangers, how do we
relate to strangers based on identity? At first it
seems as if the very concept of identity cannot
be broadened and stretched to include every-
one without discriminating against or at least
without excluding others. Identity formation is
important for various purposes, but it might not
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be positively related to generalized trust. Possi-
bly a fairly global identity or an identity that
emphasizes inclusive human values (Monroe
1991) could be related to trust that encompasses
strangers. However, I agree with Brewer (1981)
that this would be unlikely, as such an identity
is too broad to exert mobilizing effects on trust.
The possibility remains that generalized trust
is a result of one or several positive group trust
experiences that are based on such identities.
How would this work? Do several experiences
of group identity – based trust accumulate to
higher and higher levels, culminating in a dif-
ferent type of trust that appears to be more gen-
eralized? Do these two forms of trust increase
or decrease simultaneously? For a possible sce-
nario, we have to combine the insights of the
generalization of previous experiences and the
identity-based trust model. It is possible that
strong in-group cooperation experiences that
result in in-group trust with a broad sampling
of members of society directly transfer to the
outside world. In this case, generalized trust in-
volves a leap of faith that the trustworthiness of
those you know can be broadened to include
others whom you do not know. In other words,
the formative experience is likely to be much
more pronounced in contact with a diverse group
as if the association or group is itself a narrowly
constituted segment of society. The social capi-
tal school calls this sort of social interaction
“bridging”, as opposed to the opposite type of
“bonding” social interactions in which people
of a similar background come together (Putnam
2000). The assumption is that bridging social
interactions might allow for the development of
generalized trust. The mechanism would be that
the group characteristics from representatives
of the people one knows get extended to the
people of this group in general, and therefore
also to the people one does not know. For ex-
ample, the close cooperation and in-group trust
that develops in an association with a relatively
high proportion of immigrants might be trans-
ferable to the group of immigrants in the out-
side world. The more identity-categories over-
lap in the positive cooperation experience, the
easier the transfer of trust to society at large.
Consequently, personalized or group-based trust
and generalized trust would be positively related
if the social interaction takes place in a bridg-
ing context. This logic also suggests that the
close cooperation experiences with people like
oneself might not influence generalized trust,
as there is no mechanism that transfers the ex-
periences to the outside world.
Given the possibility of the mechanism of
bridging interactions, it seems plausible that not
only association members would qualify as im-
portant social interaction settings for the devel-
opment of generalized trust. One possibility is
that association members might be too similar
to us for the process of generalization, but other
dimensions of social interactions might make a
difference as well. Social interactions with
people at our workplace and in our communi-
ties might also be important social interaction
settings for the generation of trust. For example,
the cooperation experiences in a diverse neigh-
borhood with a high share of immigrants might
lead to the possibility of transfer of these posi-
tive experiences to immigrants outside one’s
neighborhood and therefore to a boost in gen-
eralized trust. The question then becomes how
strong or intense the social interactions need to
be in order for generalized trust to emerge.
Putnam (1993; see also 2000) originally sug-
gested that the positive cooperation experiences
need to involve regular face-to-face interactions
at a minimum, which points to the importance
of relatively weak types of interactions, though
not as weak as those that involve little face-to-
face interactions, for example. Yet it seems plau-
sible that thin and less intense forms of trust also
require social interactions of similar character
(thin and weak connections). It is entirely fea-
sible that the generalization of trust to the out-
side world is learned through encounters and
experiences that are of a less intense character
whereas intense experiences turn into knowl-
edge-based trust.
In sum, two important dimensions of the struc-
ture of social interactions have emerged in the
literature on generalized trust. One reflects the
question with whom one interacts, which is cap-
tured by the distinction of bridging and bond-
ing interactions (Putnam 2000). The other di-
mension depicts the strength or depth of inter-
406
action, and is captured by a distinction of strong
and weak ties that results from network analy-
sis (Granovetter 1973). Both dimensions are
visually graphed with examples in Figure 1.
According to our current insights, bridging
and weak social interactions should have the
highest potential for the development of gener-
alized trust. How do these theoretical specula-
tions play out empirically? Using voluntary as-
sociations as an example of weak and bridging
social interactions, not much evidence has been
found to confirm these hypotheses so far. Al-
though research ever since the Civic Culture has
shown that association members are more trust-
ing, the possibility exists that people self-select
into association groups, depending on their
original levels of generalized trust, for example.
This is a classic problem of endogeneity. People
who trust more might be more easily drawn to
membership in associations, whereas people
who trust less might not join in the first place.
Ideally one would track association members
over time in order to filter out the separate in-
fluence of group membership on trust and civic
attitudes, controlling for self-selection effects.
However, such longitudinal data are rarely avail-
able, and are time-consuming and costly to col-
lect. Another strategy is to compare those who
are more active with those who are less engaged
in associational life. Based on a sample with
non-members and members in various associa-
tions in three countries – Germany, Sweden, and
the United States – Stolle compared both non-
members and members, and those who had just
joined associations and those who participated
for longer periods. The finding is that member-
ship does indeed influence trust toward the other
group members and personal engagement within
the group, but with regard to generalized trust
and civic engagement outside the association,
the self-selection effects were more pronounced
than the membership effects (Stolle 1998; 2000;
2001). This essentially means that people with
higher levels of trust indeed self-select into as-
sociations. In other words, the strong emphasis
placed by society-centered accounts of social
capital on voluntary associations as the produc-
ers of generalized trust might not be warranted.
Others have recently vindicated this result
(Claiborn/Martin 2000; Hooghe/Stolle forth-
coming; Uslaner 2002).
Of course, not all associations are alike, and
their interactions patterns vary (Stolle/Rochon
1998). For example, voluntary associations can
be distinguished according to their level of in-
tensity. Wollebæk and Selle (forthcoming) ex-
amined the most extreme ends of the distinc-
tion in a comparison between passive and ac-
tive memberships. The assumption is that pas-
sive or so-called check-book memberships work
at an extremely low level of intensity without
much face-to-face contact between the mem-
bers. They conclude that while members of vol-
untary associations indeed are more trusting than
non-members, there is no significant difference
between active and passive members. This
would imply that its not necessarily the face-to-
face contact and a stronger intensity of contact
that is responsible for the generalization of trust.
The view that associations might be good
places to learn generalized trust because they
bring together people from various social back-
grounds has generally been contested. If diver-
sity matters for the socialization of cooperative
values, then voluntary associations might not
be the place to look, as such groups have been
Figure 1: Dimensions of Social Interactions
Weak Ties (no closure) Strong Ties (closure)
Bridging Interactions Diverse associations Interracial marriages
(various backgrounds) Diverse neighborhoods Interracial friendships
Bonding Interactions Homogeneous associations Same group marriages
(same backgrounds) Unions Same group friendships
Professional groups Small-knit communities
Caste
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found to be relatively homogeneous in charac-
ter (see Mutz/Mondak 1998; Popielarz 1999).
Still, even if more diverse associations are dis-
tinguished from less diverse ones, the connec-
tion between group diversity and trust seems to
depend a lot on the national context and is not a
generalizable relationship throughout all West-
ern societies (Stolle 2000). Other contexts need
to be the site for the test of the diversity hypoth-
esis. Marschall and Stolle (2002), for example,
found evidence for the importance of bridging
social contacts in the neighborhood context.10
In sum, while the hypotheses of bridging and
less intense social interactions that might be
conducive for generalized trust are promising,
they certainly need further empirical testing. So
far, these hypotheses have not been successfully
confirmed by empirical research at the micro-
level and in the associational context. There-
fore, the role of voluntary associations as cre-
ators of generalized trust is not yet established
by empirical evidence. Research by Hooghe
suggests that we cannot expect value change on
the basis of social interactions in one’s adult life.
Instead, he argues, social interactions are mostly
strengthening value patterns that are prevalent
in a certain interaction setting (Hooghe, forth-
coming). The findings so far indicate that we
need more research to understand the role of
other types of social interactions and interac-
tion settings, such as informal social interactions
outside of associational life, at the workplace,
neighborhoods, online chat-rooms, etc. How-
ever, one group of scholars suggests that gener-
alized trust is really learned in the context of
political and state institutions.
6. The Role of the State and Political
Institutions
The discussion about the role of the state and
political institutions revolves around two main
debates. One is about the extent to which the
state and political institutions exercise an inde-
pendent influence on generalized trust, as op-
posed to the claim that trust is purely a product
of social interactions. The other concerns the
disagreement about the extent to which govern-
ments’ intervention is beneficial or even detri-
mental to social capital. We explore these is-
sues in turn.
To what extent do states have an independent
effect on social capital? One state-related vari-
able has been clearly identified as being related
to trust, namely democracy (Almond/Verba
1968; Inglehart 1999). Even stronger is the re-
lationship between generalized trust and the
extent of political rights and civil liberties in a
given country (Sides 1999). Generally,
authoritarianism, or what Booth and Bayer Ri-
chard label the “repression level” in their analy-
sis of selected Central American countries, is
found to have a strong, negative influence on
trust (Booth/Bayer 1998). Repressive govern-
ments disturb civic developments in two other
major ways: first, they discourage spontaneous
group activity, and second, they discourage trust
(Booth/Bayer 1998, 43).
Surely, overpowering regimes such as com-
munist regimes or the Norman kingdom in
Southern Italy have even nurtured distrust be-
tween people. Examples of institutional influ-
ences on distrust are the state secret police in
the GDR (Stasi) and the arbitrary behavior of
political elites. In Eastern Europe, trust was able
to blossom in smaller family circles and friend-
ship niches, yet the conditions for generalized
trust were not present. No wonder that general-
ized trust levels in East Germany are predomi-
nantly lower in the East compared to the West.11
The Central American and Eastern European ex-
periences stand for examples of negative influ-
ences of governments, which can lead to the
erosion of generalized trust. Some social capi-
tal theorists generalize this notion to encompass
the strength of government in general and fear
that any form of government intervention is
anathema to the healthy development of trust.
However, we will see below that this is not the
case.
When singling out democracies, the fact is that
even though they usually score higher on mea-
sures of generalized trust there are still signifi-
cant differences between them in their ability to
generate this civic capacity. This variance needs
to be explained: What are the aspects of demo-
cratic government that matter for social capi-
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tal? Scandinavian welfare states exhibit the
highest levels of generalized trust in the West-
ern world. Two aspects can be highlighted in
the context of the importance of welfare states
for generalized trust: First the inequalities that
prevail within the society matter (Uslaner 2002).
If citizens are not confronted with large or bla-
tant inequalities between them, it will be easier
to extend one’s trust beyond the group of people
one knows or with whom one identifies. Differ-
ences in income distribution have been linked
to the variance in welfare regimes, namely dif-
ferences between universalism and means-test-
ing in welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990;
Rothstein 1998), and the tax and social security
policies associated with them. For example, in
Scandinavian countries where we find rather
low levels of income inequality – while other
types of equality such as between men and
women are highly developed – trust levels are
significantly higher than in countries marked by
economic and gender inequalities such France
and the United States. Also, temporal variations
in trust levels strongly correlate with temporal
variations in income equality in the United States
(Uslaner 2002). Citizens who see their fellow
citizens as equals and as “one of their own”
might more easily make a leap of faith and give
a trust credit to people who are not necessarily
known.
There are other aspects of welfare and other
state institutions that matter for generalized trust
(Offe 1999). Differences in government and
state capacity to monitor free-riding, to punish
defection and to direct a relatively impartial and
fair bureaucracy have not been examined thor-
oughly in an empirical and comparative way;
however, they provide a plausible explanation
for national differences in levels of generalized
trust. Rothstein and Stolle (forthcoming) argue
that there exists a micro-mechanism that could
explain the nature of the macro-link between
welfare states and trust. The claim is that means-
tested welfare states are more prone to corrup-
tion, abuse of power, arbitrary decisions from
civil servants and bureaucrats, and, most impor-
tantly, systematic discrimination than universal
welfare states. The ideal of impartiality is sel-
dom met in means-tested institutions, which are
beset by systematic inequalities. It seems plau-
sible that citizens who experience this lack of
impartiality will not develop trust in those gov-
ernment institutions that discriminate against
them. Furthermore, the observance and experi-
ence of political officials and other citizens who
promote their own interests by means of cor-
ruption or fraud as well as one’s own experi-
ence of discrimination prevents not only the
development of institutional trust, but also trust
in other citizens (Rothstein/Stolle, forthcoming).
However, the question remains as to precisely
how these experiences are generalized to the
public at large, and how institutional experiences
are transmitted and socialized. Possibly parents
play a role in transmitting their institutional ex-
periences to their children. Parents report to their
children their experiences of fairness with the
police, the judicial system, or the political sys-
tem in general which in turn influences how
children think about political institutions and
about other people.
In sum, generalized trust is not independent
of the institutional structures in which it is em-
bedded. We can find it where the institutional
incentives are structured such that they point to
the fact that cooperation and trust will be most
beneficial. In regions or nations where general-
ized trust is not institutionalized it might be true
that the institutional norms are explicitly di-
rected against trust. Such systems transmit the
message that distrust, caution, and defection pay
off most. It is possible that generalized trust and
other aspects of social capital help governments
perform better; however, selected institutional
structures facilitate generalized trust. Universal
welfare states, impartial and un-corrupt politi-
cal institutions such as the police and courts are
important institutional characteristics that seem
conducive to the development of generalized
trust.
7. Conclusion
Generalized trust is an important societal re-
source. In social science, the concept of gener-
alized trust is currently receiving extensive aca-
demic attention, and rightly so, because it plays
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a considerable role in our political and social
lives.
We have distinguished generalized trust here
from other forms of trust in the interdiscipli-
nary literature. Generalized trust is not so much
an outcome of a repeated calculation of risk as
implied in models of rational choice accounts,
though this approach seems more likely in the
interaction with specific others (knowledge-
based trust). The scope of generalized trust also
needs to be distinguished from identity-based
forms of trust, which only include people one
personally knows and those individuals who fit
into a certain social identity category that one
holds. The problem with this conception for
generalized trust is that total strangers couldn’t
be trusted as they could not be easily catego-
rized into a known social identity. What the logic
of generalized trust implies is that strangers
might be given the benefit of the doubt most of
the time (unless there are serious indications that
one should not), or not given this benefit in the
case of generalized distsrust. Generalized trust
is also not such a stable value as described in
Uslaner’s moral trust model which is mostly
independent of the circumstances; instead, it is
an attitude that has its origin in the institutional
structures in which it develops.
The most important problem with research on
generalized trust is that we know little about how
generalized trust is generated and institutional-
ized. In this article, we distinguished two im-
portant sources of generalized trust that contrib-
ute to trust development in some way though
not exclusively: the societal and the institutional
mechanisms. We have suggested that the as-
sumption of most social capital theorists as to
the efficacy of voluntary associations in produc-
ing generalized norms and values such as trust
should be taken with caution at best. There is
no empirical evidence to confirm the micro-re-
lationship between membership and trust. The
most promising leads in the societal mechanism
approach are the dimensions of bridging and
weak types of interactions that might be impor-
tant for the development of generalized trust.
In fact, in building a theory of generalized trust
we also have to look outside organizations and
social interactions per se for mechanisms that
produce, foster, and/or disturb developments of
generalized trust. In a cross-national perspec-
tive, the overpowering difference is not between
joiners and non-joiners or long-term joiners and
short-term joiners, but between members of dif-
ferent nations and regions. The reason is that
selected features of political and social institu-
tions exert a more decisive influence on civic
values and attitudes than some of the social in-
teractions that were examined. We have identi-
fied the degree to which the principles of fair-
ness and impartiality are implemented in the
welfare state as well as in other political institu-
tions such as the police and the courts as impor-
tant institutional sources of generalized trust.
However, the problem with the institutional ap-
proach is that cause and effect are not always
clarified. We know rather little about the ques-
tion whether institutions are a consequence of
or a precondition for generalized trust and so-
cial capital. It is the task of generalized trust
research to establish how exactly trust and in-
stitutions are causally related. Longitudinal data,
good research designs, and exact causal mecha-
nisms should guide further research on this im-
portant topic.
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